

Subject/Title	Workers vs. Governmental Labor Union's Tax Policies in Asymmetric Information Games
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Journal Title	Review of Social Sciences
Vol./Publishing Date	Vol.1 No.1 (2007/04)
Page(s)	127 - 162
Language	Chinese
Abstract	In nowadays society, labor unions act as a tool to pass on information on behalf of workers. This paper is based on Kessing and Konrad's model (2006). We used the game theory's sequential equilibrium (SE) method to discuss what kind of taxing or subsidizing policy will be selected when a government faces workers's decision to join labor unions. Besides, we try to loosen the restriction of balanced budget and found a better budget policy which is really beneficial for government.
Keyword(s)	asymmetric information ; sequential equilibrium ; labor union ; optimal taxation