

Subject/Title	Constitutional Rules and Rational Choice: Explanations for the Survival of Taiwan's Minority Government (2000~2008)
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Abstract	<p>After the government change over in at 2000, the power over the executive department was gained by President Chen Shui-bian and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose presence in the Legislative Yuan never became a majority until 2008. Generally speaking, there are distinctions between "formation" and "survival" of a government. Excluding presidential systems, all executive departments can be potentially dismissed by submitting act from a legislative non-confidence vote in any constitutional regime. A minority government, therefore is pretty fragile due to the lack of "trust" from parliament as a supporting foundation. In Taiwan's case, the DPP minority government is primarily based on the Additional Article § 3.1. This article combines Bergman's standpoint of negative constitutional rules and Strom's perspective on opposition rational choice and tries to clarify the survival of DPP minority government from the opposite majority's rational considerations.</p>
Keyword(s)	Legislative Vote of Non-Confidence ; Minority Government ; Government Survival ; Rational Choice